C hina and the West face anumber of common security challenges in the twenty-firstc entury. These include intra-state conflictsi n Africa,t errorist attacksa round the world,l arge-scale natural disasters and the (now-diminishing)t hreato fp iracy in the Gulf of Aden. Meeting these challenges requires in-depth international co-operation and co-ordination involving civilian,m ilitarya nd even paramilitary resources. Manyarmed forces, including thoseo ft he US, UK and China, have engaged in 'Military Operations other than War' (MOOTW) -i no ther words, 'the use of militaryc apabilities across the rangeofmilitaryoperations short of war',for example, peacekeeping,disaster reliefa nd counter-piracy operations. 1 In ag lobalised world,M OOTW are inherently multilateral. However, militaryc o-operation betweenC hina and the West is often limited by political divergence and differenti deological stances on issues of international security.
Sino-USr elations in particular makes uch co-operation difficult.
Despiteti relessa ssurances about their respectivep eacefuli ntentions,t he US and China experiencec ontinuing friction over av ariety of issues, ranging from the People'sL iberation Army's (PLA)m ilitaryb uild-up to currency exchange rates. In particular,t he United States' announcementi n2 011 of arms sales to Taiwan resulted in the cancellation of an umbero fU S-China militarye xercises. 2 Kurt Campbell and Richard Weitz arguedi n2 005 thatt he manyd eep-rooted sourceso ft ension between thet wo 'suggest the need for modeste xpectations about near-term progress both in militaryties and broader relations'. 3 This remainst he case today, even after theO bama administration emphasisedthe importance of a'deeper and moree ffectivep artnership'w ith China in the US National Security Strategy published in 2010. 4 In contrast,S ino-UKr elations are notcharacterisedbysuch friction. There has, in fact, been acertain levelofsuccess in UK-Chinese militaryc o-operation on MOOTW,p articularly in relation to UN peacekeeping andc ounter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. The key to this success lies in the fact thatt heir bilateralc o-operation has beenf ramed using multilateralp latforms, helping to easet he political risk China perceives to be associatedwith this collaboration, including thatofrevealing its real military capability to the world. China is willing to join othersinmilitaryactivity so long as its co-operation helpstofurther advance its nationali nterests andt op rojecta n image of itself as ar esponsibles tate. By focusingo ni llustrative examples of relatively successful UK-Chinese collaboration on MOOTW,t his article explores the implications of such activitiesf or aw iderd iscussiono fh ow Sino-Western co-operation canb e expanded. Indeed, the West should exploit multilateralism to makem ilitary co-operation moreattractivetoChina.
The UK'sthen-ForeignSecretaryDavid Miliband during avisit to apeacekeeping-forcetraining centre in Langfang,Heibei Province,China, March 2010.
Courtesy of Feng Li/Getty Images.
challenges requiring am ultilateral militaryr esponse as matters of national importance. China'slatestdefence White Paper,published in April 2013, advocates the establishment of military-to-military confidence-building mechanisms, and emphasisest he Chinesel eadership's focus on 'the news ecurity concepts featuring mutualt rust, mutualb enefit, equalitya nd coordination',a nd on internationalco-operation in the form of 'UN peacekeeping missions, international counter-terrorism cooperation, internationalm erchants hipping protection and disasterreliefoperations'. 5 Participationi ni nternational MOOTW also features prominently in UK foreign-and defence-policy frameworks. TheU K'sm ostr ecent defence White Papersd iscuss how to address its security challenges in ac hanging internationals trategic context. 6 The ongoingt ransition from ad ecadeo fc ombato perations in Iraq and Afghanistant oap ost-ISAF period means thatt he UK nown eeds to considern ew forms of international military engagementa nd contribution, forexample, through UN peacekeeping. 7 Strengthening mutual trusta nd confidencei si mportantt ot he PLA and the UK armedf orces, particularly because it would bettere nable the lattert ou nderstand China'ss trategy andt he PLA's futured irection. China's defence spending has increased-o ften by double-digit percentages -s ince the late 1990s. 8 This tends to raise some concerns among UK officials and scholars aboutC hinesei ntentions regarding future global politics. 9 Thep articipation of China'smilitaryforcesininternational MOOTW providesa ni dealo pportunity forittoease such concerns and projecta non-threatening imageasa'responsible state'. 10 Despitet he existing favourable policy environment,p olitical tensions hamperd eeper co-operation between the UK and China to an extent.The first of these relatestofundamental ideological differences between the two, especially regarding the wayi nw hich they understand the concept of sovereignty and their internationalo bligations. Differencesa riseo nt he question of howf ar the concept of sovereignty extends with regardst oh umanitarian catastrophei nc onflict areasa nd whethert he internationalc ommunity shouldorshould not use militaryforce in conflict areast op rotect civilians. China subscribes to ar igid interpretation of sovereignty,i nw hich statea uthority is understood as 'the ultimate authority fordealingwith all domesticand foreign affairsfaced by the nation state'.
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While some research suggestst hatC hina's interpretation of sovereignty has become moreflexible in recenty ears, it remains extremely cautious about an elastic interpretation of sovereignty thatc ould lead to militaryi ntervention without local or statec onsent. the face of such fundamentalideological differences.
The second tension lies in the two countries'ambivalentbilateralrelations, particularlyd ue to their potential effect on their internationalp ositions vis-à-vis otherk ey actors. From the UK government'sp erspective, co-operation with China cannot be promoted at the expenseo fi ts relationshipsw ith other actors of strategic importance,including the US, the EU,NATOand India. The UK needs to address anyc oncerns those actorsm ighth avea bout closerB ritish relations with China, making it is essential thatthe UK communicates itsintentions clearly and perhapstakes an incremental approach. 13 From China'sp erspective, too, the kind of co-operation it canhave with the UK is restrictedt oa ctivities thatd on ot jeopardise the country's 'independent' foreign policy.U nder no circumstances would China work under the command and controlofother states, meaning thati ts UN peacekeeping and counter-piracy operations mustb e conducted under aU Nm andate.T his is one of the reasons whyitwas difficult for China to agree to the implementation of an integrated transitcorridor,formed by the warshipso fd ifferentc ontributing nations, to counterp iracyi nt he Indian Ocean, forexample.
Thet hirdt ensioni sr elatedt o aw idespreadv iewa mongW estern analysts thatt he Chinesem ilitaryi sn ot interestedi nd eepeningi nternational militaryc o-operation. 14 An umbero fU K policy-makerssuggestedthatitisdifficult to negotiate such programmesw ith China because there is often along wait foraresponse, reportedly due in part to its complex,b ureaucraticd ecisionmaking system. 15 Morei mportantly, thism ay well be the result of the PLA's reluctancetoreveal anyg apsinmilitary capability. 16 From the pointo fv iewo f the PLA,h owever,t he perceived risk in discussing its capabilitiesi nd etail no longerp reventsi tf romp articipating in internationalmilitarymissions, to which it has an increasinglyo pen and positive attitude. 17 These tensions will be difficult to resolvei nt he foreseeable future. Therefore, althoughi ti si mportantt o recognise the cleardifferencesbetween thet wo countries,f ocusing on what is common to both is likely to be more fruitful than remainingt rappedi na cul-de-sac of stagnantd ebate over fundamentali deological and political differences,a nd speculation about whetherChina is genuinely interestedin militaryco-operation. The keyistobuild on shared interests.
UK-Chinese Military Co-operation on UN Peacekeeping Operations
UN peacekeeping operations provide opportunities fort he twoc ountries to co-operate. Indeed, China'si ncreasing participation in these operations is rooted in its desiretomaintain regional stability, an essential element of the country's 'going out'strategy.The People'sRepublic of China (PRC) is also keen to project an imageofresponsible statehood 18 -which the UK has encouraged it to substantiate through the assumption of greater internationalresponsibility.
Chinaa nd the UK have complementary strengths in peacekeeping operations. As the largest contributor of manpoweramong the five permanent SecurityC ouncil members, 19 China has deployedm oret han 10,000 soldiersa nd officersf romt he PLA and Public Armed Police to morethan twenty missions since 1988. As of October 2013, the PRCw as contributing 1,919 military and police personnel. 20 Furthermore, a number of policy-makersa nd analysts observet hatC hina tries to offer the highest possible levelofe xpertise when contributing to such missions. 21 For example, the UN Under-Secretary General fort he Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) HervéL adsous commentedthat'Chinese peacekeepers arev eryp rofessional,e xtremely welltraineda nd very committed to doing the job'. 22 Theseh igh standards were also evident in China'sc ontribution to peacekeeping in Liberiawhen one of the authorsvisited the countryinDecember 2010, with the quality of the engineering work undertaken praised by awide range of UN staffand local officials.
In contrast,t he UK's levelo f contribution to UN peacekeeping during thel astd ecadeh as been modesta t best, mainly due to its involvementi n the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. As of October 2013,t he UK wasc ontributing 284t roopsa nd police officerst oU N peacekeeping operations. 23 However, the British financial contribution to UN peacekeeping is thethirdlargest (at8.15 per cent of the total), after theU Sa nd Japan. China'sc ontribution is ranked seventha t3 .93 per cent of the total for2 013-15. 24 TheU Ka lso possesses, and therefore canc ontribute, specialist knowledgeregardingpeace enforcement and rapid forced eployment, because of its wide-ranging experiencei n interventions within andoutside the UN framework.
Such complementarityh as led China and the UK to work together on UN peacekeeping operations since 2000.T haty ear,C hina'sM inistryo f PublicS ecurity (MPS) established the China Peacekeeping CivPol Training Center( CPCTC)i nL angfang,s outh of Beijing,a nd the UK providedt he centre with some technical and equipment assistance. 25 China's participation in the UN Organization Mission in the DemocraticR epublic of theC ongo (MONUC) createdt he first opportunity fordirect UK co-operation with the PLA in the contextofpeacekeepingoperations. 26 While this wasn ot parto faf ormalised programme, China and the UK actively exchanged information before the former deployedi ts troopsf or the first time to UN operations authorised under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.ChapterVII allows UN forces to use 'all necessary means' or take 'necessarya ction'n ot only for self defence,b ut also in ensuring the protectiono fc ivilians againsti mminent physical harm. Understanding the specific natureo ft his operation was thereforee ssential to China'ss uccessful deployment.
Indeed, Sino-UKm ilitary co-operation on peacekeeping has continued intermittently since2 002, to develop Chinese peacekeepers' understanding of policy issues and practical skills. 27 Fore xample, to further advance its operational standard, China needed to improve its peacekeepers' English-languages kills.T he UK-China 'peacekeeping Englishp roject',w hich ranf rom2 007 to 2009, wasa imed at senior police officers at the CPCTC with the purposeo fb uilding English- 29 UK-Chinese military co-operation on peacekeeping demonstrates that the PRChas the capacityand the willingness to co-operatewith the West.This positive interaction has comprised as eries of isolated events that has continued since 2000, developingfromone-off donations and informal exchangeso fi nformation to formal trainingp rogrammes. The challenges of deployingh igh-quality peacekeepers and obtaining senior positions at the DPKOh avee ncouraged China to work morew ith the UK.I ti s worth noting, however, thatt his has beenpolitically costly forChina. The PLA and MPSa re particularly fearful about revealingt ot he world thel imitations of China'sc apabilities. Initiating an ew co-operation programmei nr esponse to evolving global security challenges is therefore mores tressful forC hinese policy-makers than mightbeimagined. 30 With China emergingfromalong history of internationali solation, individual senior PLA or police officers,f earful of committingapolitical error, needt o exercise caution and prudence when takingupnew ideas forcollaboration. 31 Such caution notwithstanding, the needt ol earn aboutn ew security and operationale nvironmentsd erives from the changing natureo fC hina's responsibilities in multilateraloperations on the ground. This includes moving from simply 'mimicking'other peacekeepers in so-called traditional peacekeepingactivity authorised under ChapterV Io ft he UN Charter, to having to dealwith imminent security threats from local militias and improving operational standards in non-traditionalpeacekeeping authorised under ChapterV II. 32 The keyt oC hina's policy shift towardsc o-operation with the UK therefore lies in the need to improvet he quality of its operations and information, which derivesf rom China'sstrategy of increased multilateral engagement.
UK-Chinese Military Co-operation on Counter-Piracy Operations
Piracy in the Gulfo fA den constitutes anothers ecurity threat affectingb oth China and the UK.M aintaining the safety of vessels in this regioni so f vital importance to the twoc ountries' trade:8p er cento fC hina'sc rude-oil andl iquefied-natural-gas imports come through the Gulf of Aden, 33 while15per cento ft he UK's natural-gas imports is also transportedthrough this region. 34 In whatwas the People'sLiberation Army Navy's (PLAN) first operation outside of Chinese waters,inDecember 2008 China sentas mall fleeto ft hree ships-t wo warshipsa nd one support ship with at otal crew of over 800 -a s well as twoh elicopterst ot he Gulf of Adeni na ccordance with UN Security Councilr esolutions.T he missionw as to protectChineseshipsand crews, as well as shipsc arrying humanitariana id for internationalo rganisations. To date,the PLANhas sentfifteen such deployments on rotation (the mostrecentinNovember 2013) and has escorted morethan 5,200 ships. 35 UK counter-piracy operation efforts, meanwhile, arem ultilateral, forming part of threei nternational missions: NATO's Operation Ocean Shield,t he US-led CombinedT ask Force 151 (CTF-151), and Operation Atalanta, led by the EU.T ogether,t hesem issions protectthe length of 480nautical miles of the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC), which shippingv essels areencouraged to use when crossing the Gulf of Aden. Therefore, anyco-operation with the UK needs to go through NATO, the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF)or the EU.
China and the UK have conducted escort missions separately sincet he former began itsm issionsi nt he region in 2008.T he PLAN'se scort routei s5 nautical milesnorthofthe IRTC,running parallelt oi t. Russia, India, Japan and Malaysia also protectt heir owne scort routes independently,b ut China'st ask forceisthe largest of these 'independent deployers'. 36 The reason China maintains as eparate transitc orridor from the EU,N ATOa nd CMF derives from its 'independent'f oreignp olicy,w hich postulatest hatt he country'sa rmed forces should noto perateu nder any otherstates' command and control. This also explains whyC hina proposedt he concept of the zoned escort mission in November 2011, dividingr esponsibility fors mall sectionso ft he current IRTC between the various navies presentinthe region. 37 However, this proposal seems to have faded, as it has beenreported that 'Chinai sn ot promoting zoned escorts in SHADE', the Shared Awareness and Deconflictionf orum. 38 So far, therefore, the PLANhas not contributed to the IRTC because there remain questionsa bout whose leadership it would be expected to serve under;w hatp rocess it should followinmaking promptdecisionsinan emergency,s uch as an attack by pirates or ahostage situation; and the authority with which Chinac ould command warshipsf romo ther countries if it only holds the chairmanship of the mission in rotation.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that theymaintain separatetransit corridors, Chinaa nd the EU,C MF and NATO do co-operateoncounter-piracy operations. Fore xample, since 2011 Sino-European collaboration has beene ssential to escorting World Food Programme vessels, 39 with China escorting the vessels and the EU assisting it in identifying the recipients of the cargo, to avoid the food being handed to terrorists. 40 In addition, Chinaand the UK have co-operated in a number of internationalf orat ot ackle the issuea tt he policy level. In January 2009,ac ontact groupw as setu pb y UN Security Council Resolution1 851 (2008), which broughtt ogether nearly seventyc ountries, severali nternational organisations and industryg roupsw ith an interest in combating piracy. 41 The InternationalC ontact Groupc onsists of four workingg roups, the first of which is tasked with promoting operational 
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co-ordination betweenn avies, information sharing and regional capacity building. Chaired by the UK and including China among its members, 42 the group has: 43 agreedo nan umber of concretes teps thatc ould be takent om itigatet hreats such as extending the use of industry BestManagementPractices, increasing the use of militaryV essel Protection Detachments forv ulnerable shipping, increasing the numbero fm ilitary assetsavailable forthe operations, and possibly increasing land-basedo ptions in the regiont os upport the on-going counter-piracy operations.
Since March 2009, China has also participateda sa na ctivep artner in SHADE, in which the various militaries 'deconflict't heir operations or,i no ther words, bring assets to the table 'to improvec o-ordination and minimize duplication betweent he various counter-piracy operations'. 44 SHADE convenes everyt hree months and is attended by twenty-sevenc ountries, including China, India and Japan, regional organisations such as the EU,NATOand CMF,l aw-enforcementa genciesa nd shipping-industryr epresentatives. 45 According to Captain David Reindorp, head of the Defence Crisis Management Centreo ft he UK Ministryo fD efence, co-ordination through SHADE has been 'verye ffective'.H ec ontinued:' It is probably the beste xampleo fm aritime security co-operation thatwehaveever seen'. 46 China'sp resence in these fora represents as ignificant policy shift. Sharing informationa bout military assets is regarded by the PLA as a highly delicate matter, not justb ecause this mighte xpose weaknesses in its force-projection capability,a sn oted earlier, but also because it might reveal toom uch about the wayi nw hich it operates. 47 However, when co-operation is basedo nm ultilateralp latforms such as theI nternationalC ontact Group and SHADE,C hina is willing to share informationa nd assets even though this entails political risk. It is important to note, however, thatC hina cannot take toop rominentar ole in global security co-operation as yet, because of the sense of the threatf romC hina thatother powers mightf eel. This point wasm ostv ividly revealed in the PLAN's bid fort he SHADE co-chairmanship. The PLAN had expresseda ni nteresti n leading SHADE sinceN ovember 2009, but the proposal did not come to fruition because of opposition from India at a SHADE meeting in June 2010. 48 Arguably, India wasw aryo fa ne nhancedC hinese presenceinSHADE in particular,and the Indian Ocean in general. 49 In sum, both China and the UK have utiliseds uch multilateralf rameworksa s the UN, SHADE and the International Contact Groupasthe main platforms for militaryc o-operation on peacekeeping and counter-piracy.B yc ouching co-operation in terms of multilateral frameworks, the UK has exploited China's wish to contributet oi nternational operations at ah igh standarda nd has easedChineseconcerns over therelated political riskso fd oing so. Multilateral co-operation not only helpsC hina to project the imageo far esponsible state, but also improves thequality and quantity of information available to China aboutn ew operational environments -w hich is vital to addressing security challenges in the professional manner in which the PRCw ishest op ortray its work. 50 The useo fm ultilateral platforms -and thus of institutionalised co-operation -has also helped individual Chinese militaryo fficersw hose military careersw ould be at risks hould their co-operation with Western counterparts be seen as acting on their owninitiative.
Implications for the West
The question, then, is whatt hese examples of UK-Chinese military co-operation tell us about the future direction of co-operation with China with the West moreb roadly.A usterity andthe needfor greaterburden-sharing with rising powers aren ot particular to the UK: the same logica lso appliest o the US and other European states, which mayw ell be increasinglyc ompelled to pursue astrategy of 'leading from behind' due to fiscal restraints. Furthermore, mostW estern states sharet he UK's fundamentalideological differences and ambivalent relations withChina,and are similarly faced with the PLA's apparent lack of interest in militaryc o-operation. In seeking greaterm ilitaryc o-operation with China, theym ustr ecogniset hat the keyt os uccessi nt his regard lies in devising creativeprogrammes thatallow all sidest oa void, or at least assuage, political tensions.
The bestw ay to achieve this is through the exploitation of multilateral platforms. Atop-down bilateralapproach -a greement-in-principle followedb y practicalc o-operation -w ill neverb e able to bridgethe divergent approaches pursued by China and Western states in addressings ecurity challenges. What is neededi sab ottom-up multilateral approach, in the form of creative co-operation programmes making use of multilateralc hannels thatn arrow the political divide in the long run. By usingm ultilateralf rameworkst o address common security challenges, such co-operation programmes help to build and enhance strategic trustamong practitionersinChina and the West.This willinturn lead to the institutionalisation of such programmes,potentially serving as the foundation of even greater co-operation betweenC hina and the West.
One mayq uestion hows uch a bottom-up approach could have much of an impact on the Chinese and the PLA's decision-making processes, whent he countryi sa pparently built on exceptionallyh ierarchical systems and cultures. However, this common perception is slowly changinga sC hina experiences the pluralisation of its policy decision-making processes. As Linda Jakobson and DeanK noxn ote: 'Foreignersc an no longers olely deal with one decision maker and mustt ake into accountmultiple agencies thathave as take or sayi na ny given decision'. 51 Today, it has become essential to deepen policy discussions with aw ide rangeo fC hinesea ctors, including not only the Communist Party,g overnment agencies andthe PLA,but also research organisations and the media. 52 As imilar approach to military co-operation will help China and the West to avoid being trappedi nu nproductive debate over fundamentali deological and political differences. Fore xample,
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with US-Chinesem ilitaryc o-operation diminished following the former's sale of arms to Taiwan in 2011,i ti sc leart hat the twoc ountries nown eed to take a bottom-up approach to co-operation, embedded in practical, multilateral activity rather than symbolic, bilateral efforts. Focusing on practical objectives rather than principles would makei t moredifficult fortensionoverT aiwan to impact upon US-Chinese co-operation.
As amatter of fact, Chinaand the US already co-operateinthis way-through SHADE, the InternationalContact Group and the multilateral AMAN exercises (initiateda nd organisedb yP akistan) -despitet he US announcement of arms salestoT aiwan. 53 The twocountries also conducted their first jointcounter-piracy exercise in September 2012, postponed by the Chinese governmentthe previous year. 54 Co-operation in counter-piracy operations canb ef urther strengthened by,f or example, the sharing of scarce forcee nablers, 55 such as tankersa nd medical ships, betweenChina and NATO and CMF (given thatt he US is al eading actor in these frameworks). Such burdensharing is essential not onlywithin these frameworksb ut also with others tates, such as China, thata re undertaking independentmissions. Forinstance,the Chinesen aval hospital ship Peace Ark sets ail to the Gulf of Aden on its first overseasm edicalm ission in September 2011. Thes hip'sc rewp rovided medical treatmentn ot only to Chinese soldiers and officersbut also to people in Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania, the Seychellesa nd Bangladesh wheni tc alled at portsi n these countries. 56 With medical assistance offered on seventeen separate occasions, in July 2013,t om ilitaryp ersonnel from Pakistan, Turkey,t he Netherlands and Saudi Arabia -all of whom were working fort he US-led CTF-151 57 -i tw ould be worth investigating whether such services could be extended to NATO and CMF forces more widely.C hinai sa lso considering establishing acounter-piracy base in the Seychelles, where the US already has as mall droneb ase foru se in counter-piracy operations. 58 This may provide greatero pportunities fora sset sharing,s ol ong as such co-operation is undertaken under the auspices of multilateralf rameworks. Moreover, increasingt he numbero fe xchanges betweenPLAN and Western officersand conducting jointe scort exercises with other fleets -n ot justt hato ft he USwould not only improvethe efficiency of internationalc ounter-piracy operations but would also build confidencea nd trustbetween internationalnaval forces. Thus therea re manyw aysi nw hich workingt ogether as parto fm ultilateral frameworks, forp ragmatic rather than symbolicpurposes,would help the US to strengthen bilateralrelations with China, and build military-to-military confidence.
UN peacekeeping also offers importanto pportunities ford eveloping ab ottom-up,m ultilaterala pproach to militaryc o-operation. US and European armedforcescan help the PLA to better understand whatt he minimum use of forcem eansi np ractice -c ritical for those peacekeepersw orking under a UN mandate thata uthorisest he use of 'all necessarym eans'.C urrently,C hina tends to contributef orce enablers, such as engineers and medical and transportation units. However, in January 2012, it dispatched combatforces forthe first time, in the form of asmall infantry platoon to provide forcep rotection to al argerg roup of PLA engineersa nd medical personneld eployed to South Sudan. 59 Fors imilarf orce-protection purposes, in June 2013 China alsostated thati tw ould dispatchw hati tc alls 'security forces' to the UN peacekeeping operation in Mali. 60 The threatl evels in currentA frican peacekeeping theatres makeitlikely thatsimilar force-protection deployments will be needed in future.
This recentd evelopment-t he deploymentofChineseinfantryforcesprovides Western governmentsand NGOs with moreopportunities to engagewith China by meeting its need to learn about the differents ecurity ando perational environmentsi nw hich its infantry will work. Indeed, Chinese peacekeepershave stated that the PRCn eeds to develop a morei n-depth understanding of the consequences of providing infantry to fulfil such tasksinorder to betterprepare fordoing so again in the future. 61 Western governments, including those of the US and UK,aswell as thinktanksand NGOs,havelong recommended thatC hina take am orea ctiver ole in peacekeeping by contributing infantry units. TheseWestern actorscan support China by engaging in ajointstudy of the rules of engagementi nc omplexa nd dangerous peacekeeping environments, particularly under the auspices of the UN.D uring interviews undertaken fort his article,o ne question raised by China's Peacekeeping Office was when UN peacekeeperss hould strike pre-emptively,f or instance,i nt he face of imminentt hreatt oc ivilianl ives. 62 A joints tudy should take into accountthe ongoing dialogue takingp lacea tt he UN Secretariatr egarding thee merging challenges faced by peacekeeping forces today, 63 including 'whatr obustU N peacekeeping meansinpractice'. 64 As the UN's2010 'NewHorizon' progressreport claims, 'Lack of shared understanding among Member States on thes cope and function of robustp eacekeeping hasp reventedaf ull examination of its operational implications form issions, otherp artnersa nd local populations'. 65 Co-operation betweenC hina and the West would supportt he international dialogue through whichs hared understanding canbegenerated.
Conclusion
This articleh as examined howt he UK and China have expandedm ilitary co-operation with each others ince the beginningo ft he 2000s, and explored the implications of such expansion for Sino-Western militaryco-operation in the future. Despitepolitical tensions between China and the West,S ino-Western military co-operation is made possible and, indeed, could be expandedthrough multilateralframeworks. Multilateralism providesi ncentivesf or China to expand its co-operation with the West,because theP RC inevitably needst oi mprove its MOOTW-relatedc apabilities and the quality and quantity of information available to it about newo perational environments. The experienceo f multilaterala nd institutionalised co-operation also helpst oe ase the perceptions of associatedp olitical risk widely held by manyi ndividual Chinese militaryofficers.
If Chinacan gain from co-operating with the West,i ti sa lso important to understand whatt he West cang ain in return. In terms of sharing bestpractice in relation to MOOTW,i ti sp ossible thatt he Chinesew ill learn ag reat dealw ithout adding mucht ot hese internationald eployments. Indeed, while the Chinese areeager to learn from the West,t herei sn ot much discussion among policy-makers and academics as to howt he West canl earn from the Chinese experience of peacekeeping and counter-piracy operations.
Nonetheless,t he West gains significant-ifpossiblyindirectand longterm -b enefitsf romc o-operating with the Chinese. Mutual trustand confidence betweent he PLA and its Western counterparts mustb eb uilt through investmenti nm ilitaryc o-operation programmes in the yearsa head. From the policy-maker's perspective, the establishment of collegial contacts and such entities as epistemic communities of Chinese and Western security experts, focused on militaryc o-operation, could have as ignificant impact on the policymakingp rocess on both sides. The formationo fs uch communities -t hat aree ngaged 'in articulating the cause and effect relationshipso fc omplex problems, helping states identify their interests, framing the issues for collectived ebate,p roposing specific policies, and identifying salient points forn egotiation' 
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